Non-Procedural Replacement of Constitutional Court Justices: A Threat to Democracy and Judicial Independence

Penggantian Non-Prosedural Hakim Konstitusi: Ancaman terhadap Demokrasi dan Independensi Peradilan

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2144

Keywords:

Constitutional Court, Democratic Regression, Independence of Judiciary

Abstract


The dismissal of Constitutional Court Justice Aswanto and the appointment of Guntur Hamzah as his replacement by the DPR, ratified by the President, have sparked public outcry over alleged violations of the Constitutional Court’s (MK) independence. This study aims to analyze the phenomenon of democratic regression and the erosion of MK’s independence resulting from the replacement of Constitutional Court Justices in violation of the Constitutional Court Law. The study addresses two main research questions: First, how does the non-procedural replacement of Constitutional Court Justices contribute to democratic regression? Second, what are the implications of such non-procedural actions by the DPR on the independence of the Constitutional Court? This research employs a doctrinal legal method, analyzing relevant regulations and literature. The findings reveal that, first, the non-procedural replacement of Constitutional Court Justices constitutes a symptom of constitutional backsliding that poses significant risks to democratic governance. Second, the independence of the MK’s judicial authority has been increasingly marginalized due to the non-procedural dismissal and appointment of Constitutional Court Justices, ultimately distorting the principle of checks and balances.

Author Biographies

Aprilian Sumodiningrat, Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Aprilian Sumodiningrat was born in Bondowoso Regency, April 20 1997. He completed his undergraduate degree at Jember University. Continuing his master's studies with a concentration in constitutional law at the Faculty of Law, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta and graduating in 2022. Currently, Aprilian, as he is familiarly known, works as an advocate, and is an Expert in Constitutional Law at the Secretariat of the National Social Security Council, Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture. Apart from his career as an advocate and expert, he is also a member of the UGM Faculty of Law Constitutional Study Forum.

Nabila Aulia Rahma, Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Nabila Aulia Rahma completed her undergraduate degree at Universitas Brawijaya. She continued her postgraduate studies in constitutional law at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta.

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Published

2024-12-01

How to Cite

Sumodiningrat, Aprilian, and Nabila Aulia Rahma. 2024. “Non-Procedural Replacement of Constitutional Court Justices: A Threat to Democracy and Judicial Independence: Penggantian Non-Prosedural Hakim Konstitusi: Ancaman Terhadap Demokrasi Dan Independensi Peradilan”. Jurnal Konstitusi 21 (4):588-608. https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2144.

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