Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi sebagai Tata Konstitusional Abnormal dan Implikasi Yuridis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 36/PUU-XV/2017

Titon Slamet Kurnia

Abstract


Artikel ini mencerminkan pendapat penulis yang tidak setuju dengan keberadaan KPK dan Teori Konstitusi yang mendasarinya. Artikel ini didasarkan pada teori trias politica klasik dan mengajukan pendapat bahwa keberadaan badan-badan yang bersifat eksekutif harus sesuai dengan preskripsi teori unitary executive. Sesuai dengan teori unitary executive, presiden harus diberikan kewenangan to appoint and remove setiap pejabat eksekutif secara eksklusif. Kaidah ini didasarkan pada status presiden sebagai Chief Executive. Berdasar pengertian ini, KPK, sebagai badan independen, inkonstitusional. Seturut dengan Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 yang mengkualifikasikan KPK sebagai eksekutif, tata konstitusional kita yang abnormal, dengan keberadaan KPK, harus dinormalkan sesuai dengan teori unitary executive.

 

This article expresses the author’s view to disagree with the existence of the KPK and its supporting Constitutional Theory. This article is based on classical model of the trias politica theory and suggests that the existence of executive bodies should conform with the prescription of unitary executive theory. According to the unitary executive theory, the president should have the power to appoint and remove any executive official exclusively. This norm is based on the status of the president as the Chief Executive. According to this notion, the KPK, as independent agency, is unconstitutional. In line with the Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017, qualifying the KPK as executive, our abnormal constitutional order, with the existence of the KPK, should be normalized in accordance with the unitary executive theory.


Keywords


KPK; Constitutionality; Unitary Executive

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1716

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