Otokratik Perubahan Konstitusi: Perbandingan di Hungaria dan Risiko Perubahan Formal Undang-Undang Dasar: Autocratic Constitutional Change: A Comparative View in Hungary and The Risks of Formal Change Indonesian Constitution

Idul Rishan

doi:10.31078/jk2211

Authors

Idul Rishan Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta, Indonesia https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1894-3379

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2211

Keywords:

Autocratic, Constitutional Change, Constitution

Abstract

The current trend of autocratic legalism has diversified at the level of constitutional change. Constitutional change, which was previously understood as an instrument of democratic countries to uphold protection for human rights, is now used to legitimise anti-democratic policies. Hungary is one example of the perfect practice of autocratic constitutional change. This study aims to obtain three things: first, to assess the autocratic constitutional change that occurred in Hungary. Second, the risks that can arise from the mechanism of formal changes to the Constitution, and third, to provide alternative concepts that can be used to prevent risks to the practice of formal changes to the constitution. The research is a type of doctrinal legal research. The results of the study conclude three things: first, autocratic constitutional changes occur due to the weak role of the opposition, minimal restrictions on elites or actors of constitutional change, and the requirements for change based on quantitative considerations. Second, lessons from Hungary ultimately show conditions that are almost the same as developments in Indonesia. Third, this study offers several alternatives that can be used to prevent the risk of formal change by forming a constitutional commission, forming an interim constitution, or a tiered norm clause.

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